

# **Pine Crest Model United Nations 2006**

## **African Union**

### **Topic B**

#### **Responses to Genocide and the Situation in Darfur**

##### **History of Problem**

The discovery of the Nazi concentration camps at the end of the Second World War may have aroused shock and horror throughout the world and raised the popular cry, Never again! But other voices were less certain that this particular lesson of history had really been learned. Many still see the risk that the Nazi's actions could well serve as an exemplary model for today's world: The simple fact is that it has happened once, and it could all happen again... Even if the circumstances of the Jewish genocide are different in regard both to the scale of the killings and in the methods used, it or something very much like it has indeed happened again.

As the recent crisis in Darfur demonstrates, the nature and complexity of genocide and armed conflict has altered significantly since the end of the Cold War. There has been an explosion in the incidence of intra-State conflict. Of the 59 different armed conflicts that occurred from 1990 to 2003, only four involved war between sovereign States. The actors in such conflicts have also been increasingly motivated by ethnic hatred or resentment, and conflicts have become more destructive to civilian life. An estimated 90% of global deaths in armed conflict since 1990 have been civilians. In many cases, ethnic warfare in Africa has accompanied grave human rights violations and genocide.

##### **Situation in Darfur**

The current crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two armed factions, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), rebelled against the National Islamic Front government in Darfur. The JEM and SLM claim long term government discrimination against non-Arab, African ethnic groups in Darfur, while the Sudanese governments identifies the groups as terrorists. The JEM and SLM experienced initial success against Sudanese military installations, benefiting from the support of many officers within the Sudanese regular army. The government responded by arming the Arab Janjaweed militia and by deploying the Popular Defense Force (PDF). By February 2004, a successful offensive by



government forces allowed the Sudanese government to declare a military victory over the rebels.

Both sides have been accused of grave violations of human rights including genocide. Out of a population of 7 million people, over 1.5 million are internally displaced, over 140,000 have been forced into exile, and up to 100,000 civilian have been killed. There have also been allegations of widespread use of torture, rape and sexual violence and the destruction of homes.

Over a year passed before the UN Security Council's agenda considered the situation in Sudan, passing Resolution 1556 in July 2004.<sup>9</sup> However, it was not until significant domestic political pressure had been exerted on the United States and other governments that the Security Council decided in September 2004 to address the specific issue of genocide, deciding in Resolution 1564 to 'establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable'.

The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, published on 25 January 2005, concluded that the government of Sudan was not guilty of genocide, although some of its officials may have acted with 'genocidal intent'. However, the report also concluded that the:

Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. In particular, the Commission found that Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.

In September 2003, a cease-fire was negotiated between the belligerents under the chairmanship of Chad. However, this deal broke down in December. Another ceasefire, agreed in April 2004 and negotiated with the help of the African Union (AU) and other international observers, but despite some improvement, violence and abuse continues.

### **Past Actions AU Actions**

The A.U. began to deploy a small number of monitors to Darfur following the ceasefire signed in April 2004 in N'Djamena, Chad. A commitment in late summer 2004 to increase the monitoring force to approximately 3,500 went unfulfilled for over half a year, and during this



time the A.U. was unable to secure from Khartoum a mandate for civilian protection--only a mandate to monitor the largely non-existent ceasefire. Recently, the A.U. has said it will increase its force to 7,700 by September, and possibly 12,000 by spring 2006.

As many have recognized, the A.U. is quite unable to deploy to this force-level with its own resources; and NATO as a consequence has very recently agreed to provide logistics and transport capacity. The bigger problem, however, is that even with NATO helping in this way, the A.U. is simply not up to this mission if the goal for Darfur is adequate protection for civilians and humanitarian operations. The A.U. does not have the troops, the equipment, or the essential interoperability of forces that are necessary given the scale of the crisis. Those paying the price for disingenuous suggestions to the contrary are vulnerable civilian populations and humanitarian aid workers.

The larger point here is that A.U. troops alone are both insufficient and merely a default policy--one that frees the Bush administration and its feckless European allies from the need to contemplate humanitarian intervention on an appropriate scale. Our response to the crisis has been defined not by security needs in Darfur but by the capacity of the African Union. Human rights groups have, in the main, refused to articulate this difficult truth, and an under-manned, under-equipped A.U. deployment to Darfur remains the unchallenged policy of the international community.

### **Possible Solutions and Questions to be Answered**

The situation in Darfur presents the nascent African Union with its biggest adversity yet. The supranational nature of the AU would incline it to increase its presence in Darfur and other such areas, however, the issue of national sovereignty of the nations involved always dampers these efforts. Furthermore, if the AU did increase its presence, where would the funds come from to pay military operations? Also, what kind of a role should the AU play in these peacekeeping operations. On one side the AU is providing humanitarian aide to those persecuted but on the other side, it is sometimes entering in direct combat with the governments of the very nations that make up the AU.

There is without a doubt the need for something more than military intervention when dealing with genocide and Darfur. The AU cannot allocate the military as its default option. This committee should consider in what circumstances the AU is to use military intervention as well as propose other non-violent long term solutions to prevent future genocide in Africa.